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ABSTRACT. Under the regime established by the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, decision-making remains exclusively with
the limited number of states that are entitled to appoint representatives to participate in Antarctic Treaty Consultative
Meetings. Whereas the 12 original signatory states have a permanent right to attend these meetings, acceding states may
gain consultative status only during the time they carry out substantial scientific research in the Antarctic. This paper
addresses three issues: the first relates to the problems arising out of the 'admission procedure' adopted by the original
signatory states when faced with the first application of an acceding state to become an Antarctic Treaty Consultative
Party, a procedure that has been applied ever since to similar cases. The second looks at the forms of scientific research
activities an acceding party ought to conduct in Antarctica in order to meet the requirements laid down in the Antarctic
Treaty. The third deals more generally with the issue of limited participation in the Antarctic Treaty decision-making
process, which has come under severe criticism from non-Consultative Parties and states that have not acceded to the
Treaty.
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One of the most significant features of the Antarctic Treaty
of 1959 is Article IX, which provides for the holding of
periodic meetings between the representatives of the con-
tracting parties. This provision has turned out to be of
crucial importance: it has created the framework of the
successful intergovernmental cooperation that has been
taking place in Antarctica for more than 30 years. These
meetings have been referred to as Antarctic Treaty Con-
sultative Meetings (ATCMs), a term that appears in Rule
1 of the Rules of Procedure adopted at the first meeting in
1961 (Heap 1990: Dl). The lack of formality that charac-
terises this provision is due to the opposition of claimant
states, such as Argentina, Australia, and Chile, which
strongly resisted any form of international organisation,
because this could be interpreted as a sign of the inter-
nationalisation of Antarctica. It has been criticised on the
ground that such an informal structure is 'inadequate to
deal with numerous issues and detailed drafting' (Auburn
1982: 154). This criticism appears totally unjustified in
the light of the astonishing evolution of the legal regime
drawn up for Antarctica (Quigg 1983: 150; Sahurie
1992: 111-112).
At these meetings, the participating states exchange
information; consult on matters of common interest per-
taining to Antarctica; and formulate, consider, and re-
commend to their governments measures in furtherance of
the principles and objectives of the Treaty (Article IX. 1).
An Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting can therefore
be compared to 'an institution of limited membership
exercising important functions which are central to the
work of the organisation' (Watts 1992:14). A state that
wishes to be involved in Antarctic affairs will logically
seek admission to this forum. The recent Protocol on
Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (ATCPs
1992: Articles 10,11,12, and 17) confers additional func-
tions on the ATCMs.
Admission procedure to consultative status
Access to ATCMs was originally limited to Antarctic
Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs), a term defining the
two categories of states that take part in the decision-
making process. On one hand, the 12 original signatory
states to the Antarctic Treaty have a permanent right to
attend the meetings, no matter what they do or do not do.
On the other hand, states that have acceded to the Treaty
according to Article XIII 'shall be entitled to appoint
representatives to participate in the meetings referred to in
paragraph 1 of the present Article, during such times as that
Contracting Party demonstrates its interest in Antarctica
by conducting substantial research activity there' (Article
IX.2). Unlike the signatory states, these states in theory
retain consultative status only if they continue to demon-
strate a special interest in Antarctica. Acceding states that
do not fulfil this condition are known as 'non-Consultative
Parties' (NCPs), and did not participate at all in ATCMs
until 1983. At that time, due to the steady increase in the
number of NCPs and to their wishes to be more closely
associated with the activities of the ATCMs than they had
been in the past, the Consultative Parties decided to invite
them to attend the next meeting. The Rules of Procedure
were amended to allow for their participation (Heap 1990:
D2). Two years later, Recommendation XIII-15 was
passed and put the matter on a permanent basis: the NCPs
were invited not only to the next ATCM and its Prepara-
tory Meeting but to 'all future regular Consultative Meet-
ings, and their Preparatory Meetings' (Heap 1990:1109).
The NCPs are not mere observers, but they are not entitled
to participate in the taking of decisions (Rules 26-29 of
the Rules of Procedure for ATCMs 1961, revised in 1983,
1987, and 1992).
Since the Antarctic Treaty came into force in 1961,30
states have acceded to it, half of them later becoming
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ATCPs. Allowing for the merger of the German Demo-
cratic Republic with the Federal Republic of Germany in
1990, there are 26 Consultative Parties and 15 NCPs (Fig.
1).
Oddly enough, the Antarctic Treaty is silent on the
question of the procedure by which acceding states may
obtain consultative status. It only submits it to the de-
monstration of a 'substantial scientific interest' in Antarc-
tica. It does not say who determines whether an applicant
state has complied with this requirement nor what the
criteria are for establishing 'substantial scientific interest.'
A literal interpretation of Article IX.2 may suggest, as
some authors have pointed out (Roberts 1978: 117; Au-
burn 1982: 148), that, once an acceding state has fulfilled
the 'substantial scientific interest' condition, it has an
automatic right to claim a seat at the next ATCM. This
view cannot, however, be logically sustained. Sahurie
(1992: 114) has observed that 'it is unrealistic to pretend
that the consultative parties would allow others to partici-
pate in ATCMs unless they themselves agree to it.' There-
fore, the problem consists in filling up the loophole that
affects Article IX.2 of the Antarctic Treaty. Watts has
summarised the issue: 'It would be inappropriate to allow
a prospective Consultative Party to assess for itself the
adequacy of its own Antarctic activities and then, having
decided favourably, just turn up as of right to the next
Consultative Meeting; but it would be equally inappropri-
ate for the Consultative Parties to establish an "admission"
procedure which might derogate from a right conferred by
the Treaty'(Watts 1992:15).
It was not until 1977 that the ATCPs were faced with
the first notification of an acceding state — Poland —
seeking consultative status. A Special Antarctic Treaty
Consultative Meeting was convened to deal with the issue,
and a procedure to apply in similar circumstances was
adopted. According to the rules established, a state that
considers itself to be entitled to take part in ATCMs is to
notify the Depository (the government of the United States)
of its intention and to provide the information related to its
activities in the Antarctic, in particular the content and
objectives of its scientific programmes. This notification
and the information attached to it are then circulated
among and evaluated by the Consultative Parties. Within
12 months of this communication by the Depository, the
government in charge of hosting the next ATCM convenes
a Special Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting to deter-
mine 'whether to acknowledge that the acceding State in
question has met the requirements of Article IX, paragraph
2 of the Antarctic Treaty" (ATCPs 1978). This acknowl-
edgement is subject to the agreement of all Consultative
Parties; the applicant state is then notified by the govern-
ment that hosted the special meeting.
To qualify for consultative status, an acceding state
must observe the principles and purposes of the Antarctic
Treaty. The Consultative Parties base this requirement on
Article X, which provides that no one should engage in any
activity in Antarctica contrary to the principles or purposes
of the Treaty. This means, if one accepts the opinion that
the recommendations adopted at ATCMs are included
among the principles and objectives of the Treaty, that the
Consultative Parties may urge the applicant state to ap-
prove those measures before it is acknowledged to have
fulfilled the prescribed conditions (Bush 1982: 336). So
far, each application for consultative status contained a
declaration in which the applicant state declared its inten-
tion to approve all recommendations previously adopted.
Noting that Poland had established a permanent scien-
tific station, had approved all the recommendations adopted
at previous meetings, and was conducting research in
Antarctica in accordance with Article IX.2 of the Treaty,
the Consultative Parties acknowledged that Poland had the
right to appoint representatives in order to participate in
ATCMs (ATCPs 1978). Following the same procedure,
14 additional acceding states have become Consultative
Parties: the Federal Republic of Germany (1981); Brazil
and India (1983); China and Uruguay (1985); the German
Democratic Republic and Italy (1987); Spain and Sweden
(1988); Peru, the Republic of Korea, and Finland (1989);
and Ecuador and the Netherlands (1990) (Fig. 1).
Under theprocedureadopted in 1977,access to ATCMs
depends on the unanimous agreement of the Consultative
Parties. In 1989, faced with the notifications of and
information received from the governments of Ecuador
and the Netherlands, the Consultative Parties could not
reach a consensus on whether to acknowledge that these
two states had complied with the prescribed requirements
(ATCPs 1990a). This meant that Ecuador and the Nether-
lands could not appoint a voting delegate to the Fifteenth
ATCM, which was held in Paris in October 1989. This
situation was reversed a year later when these two states
became Consultative Parties (ATCPs 1991).
This example reveals that, although the procedure
adopted in July 1977 suggests that achieving consultative
status is acknowledged and not granted, the Consultative
Parties decide, case by case, on whether to admit an
acceding state into their 'club.' One point of view is that
it 'is highly doubtful if this procedure is legally in accord-
ance with the terms of the Treaty' (Bos 1989: 102).
At the Fourteenth ATCM, in October 1987, the Con-
sultative Parties agreed with a proposal of the United
States delegation, which suggested that guidelines be
elaborated for the information that is to be submitted in
support of a notification seeking acknowledgement for
consultative status. According to these guidelines, which
in no way affect the provisions of Article IX or any party's
right to interpret those provisions, an applicant state is
expected to provide:
1. a complete description of its past scientific pro-
grammes and activities in Antarctica, including
published results or studies;
2. a complete description of its ongoing and planned
scientific programmes and activities in Antarc-
tica, including how they relate to long-term scien-
tific objectives; and
3. a complete description of the planning, manage-
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Fig. 1. Contracting Parties to the Antarctic Treaty.
Original Signatory Parties
United Kingdom
South Africa
Belgium
Japan
United States of America
Norway
France
New Zealand
USSR
(Russia since December 1991)
Argentina
Australia
Chile
31 May 1960
21 June 1960
26 July 1960
4 August 1960
18 August 1960
24 August 1960
16 September 1960
1 November 1960
2 November 1960
23 June 1961
23 June 1961
23 June 1961
Acceding Consultative Parties
Poland
Netherlands
German Democratic Republic
Brazil
Federal Republic of Germany
Uruguay
Italy
Peru
Spain
China (People's Republic)
India
Sweden
Finland
Korea (Seoul)
Ecuador
Date of accession
8 June 1961
30 March 1967
19 November 1974
16 May 1975
5 February 1979
11 January 1980
18 March 1981
10 April 1981
31 March 1982
8 June 1983
19 August 1983
24 April 1984
15 May 1984
28 November 1986
15 September 1987
ment, and execution of its scientific programmes
and activities in Antarctica, including identifica-
tion of the governmental and non-governmental
institutions involved (ATCPs 1988).
Once the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the
Antarctic Treaty has entered into force, a new condition
will have to be complied with by a state seeking for
consultative status. The Protocol's Article 22.4 requires
that a state, to be acknowledged as a Consultative Party,
must first have ratified, accepted, approved, or acceded to
the Protocol, which is regarded as an integral part of the
Antarctic Treaty.
In case of a dispute concerning the fulfilment of the
requirements to be met by an applicant state, it would
probably be referred to the disputes settlement procedure
of Article XI of the Antarctic Treaty (Bush 1982: 334).
A question that does not receive any definite answer
relates to the legal nature of the decision by which the
Consultative Parties welcome a new member in their
group. If it is constitutive, it means that the acceding state
becomes a Consultative Party on the date the decision has
been adopted; if, on the contrary, it only confirms an
existing state of affairs, the same state has become a
Consultative Party on the day it has established its station
or it has dispatched a scientific expedition to Antarctica.
Non-Consultative Parties
Czechoslovakia
(Czech Republic since
(Slovak Republic since
Denmark
Romania
Bulgaria
Papua New Guinea
Hungary
Cuba
Greece
Korea (Pyongyang)
Austria
Canada
Colombia
Switzerland
Guatemala
Ukraine
14 June 1962
1 January 1993)
1 January 1993)
20 May 1965
15 September 1971
11 September 1978
16 March 1981
27 January 1984
16 August 1984
8 January 1987
21 January 1987
25 August 1987
4 May 1988
31 January 1989
15 November 1990
31 July 1991
28 October 1992
Date consultative
status achieved
29 July 1977
19 November 1990
5 October 1987
12 September 1983
3 March 1981
7 October 1985
5 October 1987
9 October 1989
21 September 1988
7 October 1985
12 September 1983
21 September 1988
9 October 1989
9 October 1989
19 November 1990
The wording of the existing decisions leaves it open to
argue in favour of either solution. The practice, however,
has shown that acceding states have always become Con-
sultative Parties on the day their applications have been
accepted.
The measures decided at Consultative Meetings have
been traditionally referred to as 'Recommendations.' They
become effective only after they have gone through an
approval procedure of double unanimity. They must first
be approved by all present-and-voting delegates at the
Consultative Meeting and then by the governmentof each
Consultative Party (Antarctic Treaty: Article IX.4). Rati-
fication by governments usually takes time, so the effec-
tiveness of a measure is often delayed. The decision
related to the admission of a new Consultative Party does
not, however, follow the same procedure. Citing the
United States delegation's report of 24 August 1977,
concerning the case of Poland, Auburn indicated (1979:
516) that 'The final report of July 1977 was regarded as
having immediate legal effect.' As such a procedure is not
directly sanctioned by the Antarctic Treaty, it can logically
be concluded that the Parties' delegates have been empow-
ered by their governments to provide the approval required
by Article IX.4.
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Criteria for consultative status
To participate in Consultative Meetings, an acceding state
must demonstrate its interest in Antarctica 'by conducting
substantial scientific research activity there' (Antarctic
Treaty: Article K.2). The interpretation of this criterion
again creates problems. The Antarctic Treaty does not
contain any definition of what form the scientific activity
must take. It only says it must be 'substantial' and then
gives two examples of such activity, the establishment of
a scientific station or the dispatch of a scientific expedi-
tion. But Auburn has pointed out(1982: 152) that'it is not
clear how "substantial" the research must be.' The many
questions arising out of the vague wording of Article IX
have been considered in detail by Bush (1982: 334-336).
But to give an overview of the practice followed by the
Consultative Parties in 'acknowledging' thatacountry has
complied with the requirements laid down in Article IX.2
of the Antarctic Treaty appears to be useful.
The admission of new Consultative Parties
For a long time, the effective practice related to the
admission of new Consultative Parties has been to require
the establishment of a permanent station in Antarctica
(Sahurie 1992: 117). Joint expeditions organised by vari-
ous states have not been considered as sufficient evidence
of interest. Such practice has resulted in maintaining a
rather small number of Consultative Parties. To set up a
scientific station in Antarctica constitutes a heavy cost for
a developing country. According to Auburn (1982:152),
'Not only is the high entry fee of "substantial scientific
research" a hindrance to seeking status, but it is also a
disincentive to any such nation even acceding to the Treaty
when it can have no say in decision-making.' It must,
however, be mentioned that only in the cases of Ecuador
and the Netherlands have the Consultative Parties not been
able to reach a consensus on whether states had satisfied
the prescribed requirements (ATCPs 1990a). And only a
year after, the situation was altered and the two states
concerned were able to appoint delegates to vote at Con-
sultative Meetings (ATCPs 1991).
Political reasons have played an important role in the
decision to admit new members as Consultative Parties.
'Increasing demands about the more immediate economic
value of Antarctica have prompted demands for radical
changes in Antarctic processes to share in the riches'
(Sahurie 1992: 576). These demands, originating from the
countries belonging to the 'Non-Aligned Movement,'
have been included on the agenda of the United Nations
General Assembly since 1983. Since that year, the 'Ques-
tion of Antarctica' has been debated every year by the
General Assembly, and several resolutions on the topic
have been adopted despite the non-participation in the vote
of a number of Antarctic states (Beck 1993: 313-320).
The main criticism has related to participation in the
Antarctic Treaty S ystem. It has rel ied on the argument that
Antarctica forms part of the common heritage of mankind
and that the limited number of states that rule it is not
representative of the international community.
Such criticism explains why the stringency of the
requirements for admission to consultative status has been
softened in some cases. Brazil and India, for example, are
two influential third-world countries. They have been
welcome to take part in ATCMs even if they did not have
scientific stations at the time when their notifications for
consultative status were considered. The admission of
these two states to full competence in decision-making can
be seen as the answer of the Consultative Parties to those
who have criticised the privileged and exclusive nature of
the ATCPs (Beck 1986: 198). India is the only state that
has considered itself entitled to consultative status on the
very day it acceded to the Antarctic Treaty.
If ascension to consultative status by Brazil and India
can be regarded as the response of the Antarctic powers to
external criticism of the Treaty regime, the Latin American
factor appears to be another political justification for the
admission of new states to full decision-making in Antarc-
tic affairs. Using proximity (sector theory) or historical
rights (doctrine of uti possidetis) as evidence of their
interest in Antarctica, Uruguay, Peru, and Ecuador have
sought and achieved consultative status between 1985
(Uruguay) and 1990 (Ecuador). Due to the scarcity of
financial and technical means, the contribution of these
states to Antarctic science remains modest. But, as was
pointed out by Joyner and Ewing Jr (1991: 3):
Latin American geopolitics is built upon future possi-
bilities. This tendency to set present policy based on
future expectations is clearly seen in Latin American
States' attitudes toward potential Antarctic resources,
both minerals and living marine, and the premise that
technological advances will someday permit ex-
ploitation of those resources. Until that day arrives, the
need exists to preclude other States from intruding on
or interfering in Antarctic territory and access to re-
sources.
In order to fulfil the 'substantial scientific interest'
criterion contained in the Antarctic Treaty (Article IX.2),
each one of these three states established a base in the
Antarctic. Backed up by Argentina and Chile, their appli-
cations for access to the decision-making process were
accepted, although the quality of their scientific pro-
grammes remains questionable. 'Crudely put, one might
say that politicians do not need to worry so much about the
kind of work their scientists do, as long as they are there in
Antarctica and one can show that a "significant perform-
ance of research" is going on' (Elzinga and Bohlin
1993: 22).
The case of Ecuador reflects the weight of the Latin
American factor. Ecuador acceded to the Antarctic Treaty
on 15 September 1987. In 1989, when it first applied for
consultative status, there was no consensus among the
Consultative Parties 'that the scientific activities have
fully met the requirements of Article IX, paragraph 2 of the
Antarctic Treaty' (ATCPs 1990a). Six months later, on 2
March 1990, a scientific station named 'Pedro Maldonado'
was established by an Equatorian expedition on Green-
wich Island, South Shetland Islands, and the following
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November, Ecuador was welcomed among the Consulta-
tive Parties (ATCPs 1991).
The requirement of a permanent station has unfortu-
nately resulted in an undesirable consequence: the few
Antarctic areas of easy access (mainly the South Shetland
Islands) are now overcrowded with stations. Such a
concentration of human activities is likely to affect the
environment and gives rise to questions of scientific
productivity and the need for cooperation (Heap
1990:2111-2113).
This issue has been dealt with on several occasions by
the Consultative Parties. In Recommendation XIII-6, they
recommended to their governments 'that where stations
have been established in the same vicinity the concerned
national Antarctic operating agencies should consult to-
gether, by whatever means found appropriate, so as to
safeguard existing scientific activities, avoid operational
logistic difficulties and avoid undue adverse environmen-
tal effects arising from cumulative impacts' (ATCPs 1986).
During the Fourteenth ATCM, although no recom-
mendation was adopted on the subject, the discussion
focused on three aspects of the matter. First, the Consulta-
tive Parties agreed, in order to increase the opportunities
for contributing to scientific knowledge, that 'new stations
should be so situated as to maximize their scientific poten-
tial and should not be situated in locations which devalue
the programmes of existing stations.' Second, it was
suggested that consultation before, rather than after, the
station is established would be preferable. Third, a pro-
posal was made to create a new category of protected areas
in connection with land-use planning around existing
stations (ATCPs 1988).
At the next Consultative Meeting, which was held in
Paris in 1989, Recommendation XV-17 was adopted
(ATCPs 1990b). Summarising the discussion of the pre-
vious meeting, it urged that parties considering the esta-
blishment of a new station prepare a comprehensive envi-
ronmental evaluation as defined in Recommendation XIV-
2 (ATCPs 1988). Multiple-Use Planning Areas (MPAs)
have also been created in order to coordinate the manage-
ment of human activities in those areas where they pose
identified risks of mutual interference or cumulative envi-
ronmental impacts (ATCPs 1990b: Recommendation XV-
11). In 1991 the Protocol on Environmental Protection to
the Antarctic Treaty generalised the obligation of assess-
ing the environmental impacts of all human activities in
Antarctica (Article 8) and its Annex I set out the procedure
in great detail.
In 1990 the Netherlands became a Consultative Party
although it had not established and did not plan to estab-
lish a station in Antarctica. Its scientists have, however,
undertaken a wide variety of scientific studies in various
parts of the Antarctic, either on their own or in cooperation
with expeditions of other nations, since the accession of
their country to the Antarctic Treaty. Moreover, the
Netherlands has developed a programme of environmen-
tal impact studies on King George Island, for which
purpose it was planned to rent a large part of Poland's
Arctowski station (ATCPs 1991).
The new interpretation of the 'substantial scientific
interest' criterion opens promising perspectives for the
future. From now on it may well not be enough to build a
small station on King George Island and to declare that
scientific research is conducted there in order to attain the
right to participate in Consultative Meetings: 'it seems
possible that the ATCPs may be tempted to reinterpret the
"substantial scientific activity" clause in Article IX of the
Antarctic Treaty, in order to remove an "artificial stimu-
lus" for the construction of additional permanent facilities
in Antarctica, with attendant damage done to the environ-
ment' (Joynerand Ewing Jr 1991: 45). This interpretation
could also contribute to the improvement of the science
that is undertaken in the Antarctic. And itcould eventually
help to reduce the environmental impacts resulting from
the concentration of human activities in easily accessible
sites for stations.
Problems related to limited participation
In a slowly dying debate in front of the United Nations
General Assembly (Beck 1993: 313-320), the Antarctic
Treaty System (ATS) has been subject to severe criticism
coming from states belonging to the Non-Aligned Move-
ment. According to them, the fundamental problem relates
to theexclusiveness of the decision-making process. Speak-
ing of the'rights'of the Consultative Parties, the Malaysian
Ambassador, Zain-Azraai, asserts 'that, under the Treaty,
the ATCPs — and they alone — have the rights to make
decisions ('exclusive'), and that the ATS assert rights to
regulate all activities in Antarctica ('total'), and that deci-
sions within the ATS are not subject to review or even
discussion by any other body ('unaccountable')' (Zain-
Azraai 1987: 212). The distinction between Consultative
Parties and other Treaty parties has also come under attack
from authors writing from the perspective of non-Con-
sultative Parties (Bruckner 1986; Caflisch 1992: 160).
The latter argues that this distinction, which might have
been justified 'when Antarctic activities focused on scien-
tific matters' has become discriminatory, as other matters,
such as the preservation of the environment, are gaining
importance. 'Why, men, should some states be more equal
than others when it comes to establishing an environmen-
tal regime for the Antarctic region?' (Caflisch 1992: 160).
To overcome these difficulties, critics have put for-
ward various proposals to increase the representation of
the international community in the decision-making proc-
ess or to replace the actual Treaty System by a universal
regime similar to the one established for the sea-bed by the
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 (Orrego Vicuna
1988: 479^192).
Most of these critics are unjustified. The Antarctic
Treaty is open to any United Nations member or any other
state, with the consent of all Consultative Parties for the
latter. Today, 41 states representing a great majority of the
world population and the main political and economic
regimes have ratified the Treaty (Fig.l). Certainly, deci-
sion-making remains exclusively within a limited group of
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parties. A system in which parties have different rights and
obligations is, however, not new in public international
law. As the French international lawyer Ren6-Jean Dupuy
(1960: 119; translation by F. Orrego Vicufla) has pointed
out: 'This hierarchical system is unusual in that it is based,
not on qualitative criteria, but on considerations of quan-
titative nature: the actual importance of research carried
out in the Antarctic. This is what gives the Treaty a
character usually found in treaties dealing with technical
matters or which set up specialised communities.'
Science has been at the origin of the Antarctic Treaty
(Gould 1970: 5-10). Today, it remains the main activity
carried out in the Antarctic. Therefore, access to decision-
making must continue to be restricted to those with direct
interest and knowledge of Antarctica (Conforti 1987: 3).
It is wrong to claim that the Treaty System protects only the
interests of its members. It should not be forgotten that the
Consultative Parties also belong to the international com-
munity and that they have succeeded in managing Antarc-
tica in the interest of mankind for more than 30 years
(Sahurie 1992: 582). By limiting the participation in
decision-making to those having a concrete experience of
the region, the Consultative Parties have succeeded in
establishing a stable political order for Antarctica. Such
achievements cannot be ignored, even if they have yet to
convince the wider international community of the gains.
Conclusions
The Antarctic Treaty limits access to decision-making to
those states that have a special scientific interest in Antarc-
tica. It does, however, not say who is responsible for
determining if an acceding state seeking consultative
status has satisfied this requirement. The obscure wording
of the Antarctic Treaty on this matter, if it has proved to be
politically advantageous, allowing for pragmaticand policy
considerations, creates legal problems. It has given rise to
conflicting interpretations on whether or not an acceding
state automatically becomes a Consultative Party when it
has fulfilled the condition. The only way to solve this
juridicial problem would be to amend Article IX.2 of the
Antarctic Treaty. Such a procedure is very unlikely to
happen due to the fact that no state is ready to threaten the
future of the Antarctic regime by calling for a review
conference.
Existing Consultative Parties have been wise enough
not to opt for either one or the other interpretation: they do
not 'grant' consultative status but they simply 'acknowl-
edge' thatan applicant state has met the prescribed require-
ments. In practice, however, decisions have been made
case by case depending on the influence of the prospective
Consultative Party. An examination of the scientific
merits of the programmes put forward by acceding Con-
sultative Parties clearly demonstrates that the level of
research undertaken by the first two applicants was signifi-
cantly higher than that carried out by subsequent appli-
cants, such as Brazil, India, China, Uruguay, or Ecuador.
However, the admission of leading third-world countries
to decision-making has been a means to undermine the
criticism related to the exclusiveness of the Antarctic
Treaty System originating in the Non-Aligned Movement
and amplified, since 1983, by a yearly debate at the United
Nations General Assembly.
Until 1990, a state seeking consultative status had to
establish a permanent scientific station in Antarctica and to
declare that it would abide by the principles of the Treaty
in order to satisfy the criteria for admission. Such policy
unfortunately resulted in the congestion of easily accessi-
ble sites for stations. The recent concern for the protection
of the Antarctic environment, which has materialised in
the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic
Treaty, is likely to affect the issue. Since the admission of
the Netherlands in 1990, it is not necessary to set up a
permanent station to meet the requirements laid down in
the Antarctic Treaty. This must be seen as an important
precedent. Not only does it demonstrate the concern of the
Consultative Parties for the protection of the en vironment,
but it should also improve the quality of scientific pro-
grammes carried out in Antarctica. It remains, however, to
be seen if the admission policy becomes more restricted in
the future than it has been in the recent past.
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